{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/amazon-rds/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Amazon RDS"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["aws","rds","snapshot","backup","datadestruction"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AWS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis rule detects the deletion of AWS RDS DB snapshots or configuration changes that effectively remove backup coverage for a DB instance. RDS snapshots contain full backups of database instances, and disabling automated backups by setting \u0026quot;backupRetentionPeriod=0\u0026quot; has a similar impact by preventing future restore points. A threat actor with sufficient AWS permissions may delete snapshots or disable backups to inhibit recovery, destroy forensic evidence, or prepare for follow-on destructive actions such as instance or cluster deletion. The rule focuses on successful snapshot deletions and backup disabling events within AWS RDS. The scope includes any AWS environment utilizing RDS for database services.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains access to an AWS account with sufficient permissions to manage RDS instances and snapshots, possibly through compromised credentials or an IAM role with excessive privileges.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker enumerates available RDS DB instances and snapshots within the target AWS account using AWS CLI or API calls (e.g., \u003ccode\u003eDescribeDBSnapshots\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eDescribeDBInstances\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker identifies target DB instances and their associated snapshots that are critical for recovery or contain valuable forensic data.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker deletes RDS DB snapshots using the \u003ccode\u003eDeleteDBSnapshot\u003c/code\u003e API call, effectively removing restore points.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAlternatively, the attacker modifies the DB instance configuration using the \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e API call, setting \u003ccode\u003ebackupRetentionPeriod\u003c/code\u003e to 0 to disable automated backups and prevent future restore points.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker may then delete the RDS instance itself using DeleteDBInstance.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker attempts to cover their tracks by deleting relevant CloudTrail logs or disabling CloudTrail logging.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker's objective is to prevent restoration to a known-good state and destroy forensic evidence of attacker actions, potentially as part of a ransomware attack or data exfiltration attempt.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful deletion of RDS snapshots or disabling of backups can lead to significant data loss and prolonged downtime, making recovery from security incidents or operational failures difficult or impossible. This can impact business continuity, data integrity, and regulatory compliance. The precise impact depends on the criticality of the affected databases and the availability of alternative backup mechanisms. If successful, this can result in total data loss for the organization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the provided Sigma rule to your SIEM to detect suspicious \u003ccode\u003eDeleteDBSnapshot\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eDeleteDBClusterSnapshot\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e events setting \u003ccode\u003ebackupRetentionPeriod=0\u003c/code\u003e in AWS CloudTrail logs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRestrict IAM permissions for \u003ccode\u003erds:DeleteDBSnapshot\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003erds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot\u003c/code\u003e, and \u003ccode\u003erds:ModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e (especially backup and deletion-related parameters) to a small set of privileged roles, as described in the remediation steps.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUse AWS Config rules and/or Security Hub controls to detect instances with \u003ccode\u003ebackupRetentionPeriod=0\u003c/code\u003e, as recommended in the hardening and preventive controls section.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-07-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-07-03T12:00:00Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-07-aws-rds-snapshot-deletion/","summary":"The deletion of AWS RDS DB snapshots or disabling backups via configuration changes can inhibit recovery, destroy forensic evidence, and prepare for destructive actions by adversaries.","title":"AWS RDS Snapshot Deletion Detected","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-07-aws-rds-snapshot-deletion/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Amazon RDS","Amazon Aurora"],"_cs_severities":["medium"],"_cs_tags":["cloud","aws","rds","datadestruction"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AWS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe deletion of Amazon RDS DB instances, Aurora clusters, or global database clusters can lead to permanent data loss and major service disruption. This activity is often carried out by adversaries who have gained sufficient permissions within an AWS environment. The motivation behind such actions can range from impeding recovery efforts following a ransomware attack, destroying critical evidence to hinder forensic investigations, or directly inflicting operational impact on the targeted environment. Defenders should be aware that these actions are irreversible without backups, making swift detection and validation essential to mitigate potential damage.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn adversary gains initial access to the AWS environment, potentially through compromised credentials or an IAM role with excessive permissions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker enumerates existing RDS DB instances, Aurora clusters, or global database clusters within the target AWS account to identify valuable targets.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker modifies the deletionProtection setting on the target RDS resource to \u003ccode\u003efalse\u003c/code\u003e to allow deletion.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker may disable or modify backup configurations to prevent recovery options, such as setting backupRetentionPeriod to \u003ccode\u003e0\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker executes the \u003ccode\u003eDeleteDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eDeleteDBCluster\u003c/code\u003e, or \u003ccode\u003eDeleteGlobalCluster\u003c/code\u003e API call to initiate the deletion process.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIf configured, the attacker may attempt to delete any final snapshots created during the deletion process to further hinder recovery.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe targeted RDS resource is permanently deleted, resulting in data loss and potential service disruption.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by deleting relevant CloudTrail logs or modifying IAM policies.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe deletion of RDS DB instances or clusters can lead to significant data loss, disrupting critical business operations. Depending on the size and importance of the deleted resources, organizations may face substantial financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties. If backups are unavailable or have also been compromised, data recovery may be impossible, leading to long-term business disruption. The impact can affect organizations of any size that rely on AWS RDS for data storage and retrieval.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eAWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Deleted\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect unauthorized RDS resource deletions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable deletionProtection on all critical RDS instances and clusters to prevent accidental or malicious deletion.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnforce MFA for IAM users with RDS privileges to reduce the risk of compromised credentials (reference the additional information links).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor CloudTrail logs for changes to deletionProtection settings and backup retention policies.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRegularly review and audit IAM policies to ensure that users and roles have only the necessary permissions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement a process for validating unexpected RDS resource deletions with the service owner or database administrator.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEnable Sysmon process-creation logging to correlate with CloudTrail logs in case CLI or SDK tools are used for deletion.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T12:00:00Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-rds-deletion/","summary":"An adversary with sufficient permissions may delete RDS resources such as DB instances or clusters to impede recovery, destroy evidence, or inflict operational impact on the environment.","title":"AWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Deleted","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-aws-rds-deletion/"},{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["Amazon RDS"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["cloud","aws","credential-access","rds"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["AWS"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThis analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. The detection leverages AWS CloudTrail logs ingested via Amazon Security Lake to identify events where the \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBCluster\u003c/code\u003e API calls include a new \u003ccode\u003emasterUserPassword\u003c/code\u003e parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, which may contain sensitive information such as credit card numbers, PII, or protected health information. If the password reset is confirmed to be malicious, it could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. This detection is based on version 8 of the Splunk Security Content analytic \u0026quot;ASL AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset\u0026quot; published on April 15, 2026.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains initial access to an AWS account, potentially through compromised credentials (T1110) or phishing (T1586.003).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker leverages the AWS Management Console or AWS CLI to interact with the RDS service.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker issues a \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBCluster\u003c/code\u003e API call.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWithin the \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBCluster\u003c/code\u003e API call, the attacker includes the \u003ccode\u003emasterUserPassword\u003c/code\u003e parameter.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe RDS service processes the request and resets the master user password for the specified database instance or cluster.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker uses the newly reset master user password to authenticate to the RDS database instance.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker gains access to sensitive data stored within the RDS database.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker exfiltrates or manipulates the data for malicious purposes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA successful attack resulting in unauthorized password reset can lead to a complete compromise of the RDS database instance. This could result in data breaches with millions of records exposed, regulatory fines for non-compliance (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA), and severe reputational damage affecting customer trust and stock prices. Sectors heavily reliant on RDS databases, such as finance, healthcare, and e-commerce, are particularly vulnerable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u003ccode\u003eAWS RDS Master User Password Reset\u003c/code\u003e to your SIEM and tune for your environment using AWS CloudTrail logs ingested via Amazon Security Lake.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eInvestigate any detected instances of \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBInstance\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003eModifyDBCluster\u003c/code\u003e API calls containing the \u003ccode\u003emasterUserPassword\u003c/code\u003e parameter by pivoting to the originating IP address (\u003ccode\u003esrc_endpoint.ip\u003c/code\u003e) and user agent (\u003ccode\u003ehttp_request.user_agent\u003c/code\u003e) from the Sigma rule.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all AWS accounts, especially those with permissions to manage RDS instances, to mitigate compromised credential attacks (T1110).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview and enforce the principle of least privilege for IAM roles, ensuring that users only have the necessary permissions to perform their job functions.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMonitor AWS CloudTrail logs for other suspicious API calls related to RDS, such as modifications to security groups or network ACLs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-01-03T10:00:00Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-03-aws-rds-password-reset/","summary":"Detection of unauthorized master user password resets for Amazon RDS DB instances via AWS CloudTrail logs, potentially leading to sensitive data access and data breaches.","title":"AWS RDS Master User Password Reset Detection","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2024-01-03-aws-rds-password-reset/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Amazon RDS","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}