Amazon DynamoDB

An Elastic detection rule identifies when a single AWS identity, using the AWS CLI, performs more than five distinct read-only discovery API calls (such as Describe*, List*, Get*, and Generate*) across various AWS services within a 10-second window, indicating reconnaissance by an adversary using compromised credentials or an exploited EC2 instance to map the AWS infrastructure for potential targets and further exploitation.

This threat detection rule identifies initial reconnaissance activities within AWS by flagging an IAM principal's first-time invocation of sensitive discovery APIs, such as GetCallerIdentity, ListUsers, ListBuckets, and DescribeInstances, when the originating IP address is associated with consumer VPNs, high-usage hosting providers, or networks linked to threat groups like TeamPCP, indicating an attacker performing enumeration of cloud resources from a suspicious network origin.

Adversaries can exploit the creation of AWS Lambda event source mappings to establish stealthy persistence and execution, or to continuously siphon records from event sources like Amazon SQS, Kinesis, DynamoDB, MSK, Kafka, or MQ, by mapping an event source to an attacker-controlled Lambda function, enabling durable execution and data exfiltration without requiring further interactive access.