Attack Chain

1. An attacker identifies a target system utilizing @sigstore/oci (or GitHub Actions like actions/attest) for pushing artifacts to OCI registries.
2. The attacker researches or infers that the target system has configured credentials for a legitimate OCI registry (e.g., ghcr.io) stored in its ~/.docker/config.json.
3. The attacker registers or gains control over a malicious OCI registry with a hostname that is a substring of the legitimate registry's hostname (e.g., cr.io for ghcr.io).
4. The attacker influences the target system to push artifacts to the attacker-controlled registry by manipulating the destination registry or image reference. In the context of GitHub Actions, this might involve influencing the subject-name input when push-to-registry: true.
5. During the artifact push operation, the @sigstore/oci library calls getRegistryCredentials() to retrieve authentication.
6. Due to the substring matching logic, getRegistryCredentials() incorrectly selects the credentials intended for ghcr.io (because cr.io is a substring).
7. The @sigstore/oci library then transmits these long-lived registry credentials to the attacker-controlled registry (cr.io).
8. The attacker captures the stolen registry credentials, gaining unauthorized access to the legitimate registry.

Impact

The primary impact of CVE-2026-59891 is the potential exposure of sensitive, long-lived OCI registry credentials. Any consumer of @sigstore/oci or related GitHub Actions (such as actions/attest, actions/attest-build-provenance, and actions/attest-sbom) that pushes artifacts using credentials from a Docker configuration file is susceptible. While no specific victim count is provided, the theoretical worst-case scenario involves the theft of valuable authentication tokens, granting attackers unauthorized access to artifact repositories, enabling supply chain attacks, or facilitating further lateral movement. Exploitation requires specific conditions: credentials in the Docker config, untrusted influence over the destination registry, and an attacker-controlled registry with a substring hostname.

Recommendation

• Patch CVE-2026-59891 immediately: Upgrade @sigstore/oci to version 0.7.1 or later to fix the credential selection logic.
• Update GitHub Actions: Ensure that your GitHub Actions workflows using actions/attest, actions/attest-build-provenance, or actions/attest-sbom are updated to versions that bundle the patched @sigstore/oci library.
• Validate input: Treat the destination registry/image reference as trusted input; do not allow untrusted sources to influence the registry/image reference passed to @sigstore/oci or the subject-name of actions/attest* when push-to-registry: true.
• Limit ~/.docker/config.json credentials: Restrict the credentials available in the host's Docker config file (~/.docker/config.json) to only those strictly necessary for operations, and avoid authenticating to registries whose hostnames could have substring relationships with potential untrusted destinations.
• Scope tokens narrowly: Prefer using narrowly scoped and short-lived registry tokens to minimize the impact of potential credential leakage.