Attack Chain

1. An authenticated user accesses an application integrated with @better-auth/scim and generates a SCIM bearer token, leveraging either the default canGenerateToken policy or a custom policy vulnerable to providerId collision.
2. The attacker identifies a legitimate providerId (e.g., from an SSO, SAML, OIDC, or social provider) already in use by other account rows within the application's database.
3. The attacker crafts the SCIM bearer token or modifies its providerId to explicitly collide with this identified legitimate providerId.
4. Using this maliciously crafted SCIM token, the attacker sends a DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:id API request to the application, targeting a specific user ID.
5. The @better-auth/scim plugin, due to the providerId collision, incorrectly maps the request to a global user account associated with the legitimate, colliding provider, even if the SCIM token never provisioned that user.
6. The application proceeds to delete the global user and their associated sessions, leading to unauthorized account access removal and denial of service for the legitimate user.
7. Alternatively, the attacker could use PUT or PATCH requests with the crafted token to rewrite global profile fields for SSO-provisioned organization members by leveraging the providerId collision.
8. Further exploitation includes leveraging the absence of email uniqueness checks in PUT or PATCH updates to assign one user's email to another, potentially corrupting user login and lookup capabilities.

Impact

The provider-ID collision issue allows an authenticated attacker to gain unauthorized access to and manipulate user accounts not under the SCIM token's legitimate scope. Attackers can delete global user records, modify profile information for SSO-provisioned organization members, and potentially corrupt email-keyed login data by reassigning email addresses without uniqueness checks. The deactivation flaw means terminated users might retain access, as the active: false attribute is ignored, allowing continued presence in the system even after an identity provider signals deprovisioning. These vulnerabilities pose a critical risk of widespread account takeover, denial of service, and data integrity issues for affected applications.

Recommendation

• Immediately upgrade @better-auth/scim to version 1.6.22 or 1.7.0-beta.10 to address the providerId collision, deactivation, and email update vulnerabilities.
• If immediate upgrade is not possible, configure the canGenerateToken policy to explicitly reject providerId values that match any existing built-in, social, generic OAuth, SSO, SAML, or OIDC account provider IDs in your application.
• Restrict the generation of SCIM tokens to only trusted, privileged users to limit exposure to these vulnerabilities.
• Audit existing scimProvider rows in your application and remove any rows whose providerId matches another existing account provider namespace.
• Avoid relying solely on deactivation reports from your identity provider; manually confirm that deactivated users have lost access, particularly if your identity provider uses active: false for deprovisioning.