Cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:3.7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/cpes/cpe2.3atraefiktraefik3.7.0rc1/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioSat, 25 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0000Traefik ForwardAuth Authentication Bypass via Header Spoofinghttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-traefik-auth-bypass/Sat, 25 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-04-traefik-auth-bypass/Traefik's `ForwardAuth` and snippet-based authentication middleware has a high severity authentication bypass vulnerability because it does not sanitize header aliases with underscores, allowing attackers to spoof trust context and bypass authentication on protected routes.A high severity authentication bypass vulnerability exists in Traefik versions before 2.11.43, 3.6.14, and 3.7.0-rc.2, affecting the ForwardAuth middleware and snippet-based authentication. The vulnerability stems from incomplete sanitization of forwarded headers. Traefik's logic only targets canonical header names like X-Forwarded-Proto, failing to strip or normalize alias variants that use underscores instead of dashes (e.g., X_Forwarded_Proto). This allows attackers to inject spoofed trust context, such as a trusted scheme or host, through the alias headers. If the authentication backend normalizes underscore and dash header forms equivalently, an attacker can bypass authentication on protected routes without valid credentials. This impacts deployments where authorization decisions rely on forwarded headers.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker identifies a Traefik instance using ForwardAuth or snippet-based authentication.
  2. The attacker discovers that the authentication backend normalizes header names, treating X_Forwarded_Proto and X-Forwarded-Proto as equivalent.
  3. The attacker crafts an HTTP request with alias headers, such as X_Forwarded_Proto: https and X_Forwarded_Host: trusted.example.
  4. Traefik receives the request and forwards it to the authentication backend without sanitizing the alias headers.
  5. The authentication backend processes the request and normalizes the header names.
  6. The authentication backend evaluates trust predicates based on the spoofed values in the alias headers.
  7. The authentication backend incorrectly determines that the request is authenticated based on the spoofed trust context.
  8. Traefik grants the attacker access to the protected resource, bypassing authentication.

Impact

This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and access protected endpoints. In deployments where authorization decisions depend on forwarded headers, attackers can interact with backend services as if they were fully authenticated. This can expose sensitive internal functionality and data, potentially leading to data breaches or unauthorized access to critical systems. Successful exploitation undermines the security provided by ForwardAuth and similar authentication mechanisms.

Recommendation

  • Upgrade Traefik to version 2.11.43, 3.6.14, or 3.7.0-rc.2 or later to address the vulnerability.
  • Implement a unified normalization policy across all forwarded header families, including RFC7239 and X-Forwarded-* to remediate the root cause.
  • Deploy the Sigma rule Detect Traefik ForwardAuth Bypass Attempt to identify exploitation attempts based on the presence of unusual X_Forwarded_* headers.
  • Restrict the headers forwarded to authentication services using an explicit allowlist to minimize the attack surface.
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