Consequently, applications relying on proxy-addr (commonly used by Express) will accept the X-Forwarded-For header provided by any unauthenticated client as the legitimate remote IP address. This flaw allows attackers to bypass IP-based access controls, rate limiting, and geolocation restrictions, while simultaneously poisoning audit logs with attacker-controlled IP addresses. The vulnerability affects any configuration where an IPv6 trust subnet includes zero leading bits, such as ::/1.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass security measures dependent on the client IP address. This impacts any application using Express or other frameworks that leverage proxy-addr for IP trust decisions. If exploited, an attacker can bypass rate limiting, circumvent IP-based authentication, and mislead security monitoring systems by injecting arbitrary values into the X-Forwarded-For header. The scope is widespread for web applications that utilize complex IPv6/IPv4-mapped networking configurations.

Recommendation

• Upgrade the proxy-addr package to version 2.0.8 or later immediately to patch CVE-2026-90711.
• Audit existing proxy-addr trust configurations for IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation.
• If IPv4-mapped notation is required, ensure the prefix covers the full mapped marker (e.g., use ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104 instead of /8).
• Prefer plain IPv4 notation (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8) for IPv4 subnets to eliminate potential parsing ambiguity.