The crypto.setEngine() function is exposed to the sandbox when crypto is an allowed builtin. This function accepts a filesystem path and instructs OpenSSL to load the referenced dynamic library as a cryptographic engine. Crucially, the operating system's dynamic loader executes the library's constructor logic before OpenSSL performs any validation of the library's validity as a cryptographic engine. An attacker providing a malicious package can place a dynamic library on disk and trigger its execution from the sandbox, gaining the privileges of the host process regardless of other sandboxing restrictions.

Attack Chain

1. Attacker crafts a malicious package containing a compiled native dynamic library (e.g., .so or .dylib).
2. Attacker provides the package to an application that processes untrusted plugins (e.g., code runner, automation platform).
3. The application saves the package contents to the local filesystem.
4. The application initializes a NodeVM instance, granting access to the crypto builtin but restricting other modules.
5. The attacker's JavaScript code within the NodeVM calls crypto.setEngine(pathToBundledLibrary).
6. vm2 forwards the call to the host-realm crypto.setEngine function.
7. The host process loads the attacker's dynamic library via the operating system's native loader.
8. The library's constructor executes arbitrary native code within the host process, achieving full system compromise.

Impact

This vulnerability allows for a complete sandbox escape, granting the attacker the operating-system identity and permissions of the host Node.js process. Potential impact includes unauthorized access to environment variables, application secrets, credentials, and internal data. Attackers can modify application code, establish persistence, access internal network services, steal data from other tenants sharing the same process, or perform any action permitted to the host user account.

Recommendation

Prioritize upgrading all instances of the affected vm2 package.

• Upgrade vm2 to a version beyond 3.11.6 immediately, as there are no configuration-based mitigations that safely allow the crypto builtin while preventing this attack vector.
• Audit all applications utilizing vm2 for NodeVM configurations that grant access to the crypto builtin, specifically in multi-tenant or untrusted plugin scenarios.
• Implement process-level sandboxing (e.g., containerization, gVisor, or restricted service accounts) to limit the potential impact of native code execution if an application remains vulnerable.