{"description":"Trending threats, MITRE ATT\u0026CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.","favicon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.png","feed_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/cpes/cpe2.3aopengaussconnector-jdbc/feed.json","home_page_url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/","icon":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/apple-touch-icon.png","items":[{"_cs_actors":[],"_cs_cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:opengauss:connector-jdbc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"_cs_cves":[{"cvss":7,"id":"CVE-2026-111440"}],"_cs_exploited":false,"_cs_has_poc":false,"_cs_poc_references":[],"_cs_products":["openGauss-connector-jdbc (\u003e= 1.1.0, \u003c= 6.0.6; 7.0.0-RC1, 7.0.0-RC2, 7.0.0-RC3)"],"_cs_severities":["high"],"_cs_tags":["vulnerability","deserialization","remote-code-execution"],"_cs_type":"advisory","_cs_vendors":["openGauss"],"content_html":"\u003cp\u003eThe openGauss-connector-jdbc library contains a deserialization-style vulnerability located in the LogFactory.java class. The vulnerability stems from an insecure implementation of the logger class loading mechanism, where the application uses Class.forName to load a class specified by the JDBC connection string or properties. The LogFactory subsequently invokes the constructor of the loaded class via reflection and casts it to a Log type without performing proper type validation using asSubclass(Log.class).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn attacker who can influence the JDBC connection properties or the JDBC URL can specify an arbitrary class name that exists within the application's classpath. Because the library fails to verify that the specified class implements the Log interface before instantiation, the constructor of the attacker-supplied class is executed. This can result in unintended code execution or side effects on the client side, depending on the side effects triggered by the target class constructor. This vulnerability affects versions 1.1.0 through 6.0.6, as well as 7.0.0-RC1, 7.0.0-RC2, and 7.0.0-RC3.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"impact\"\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSuccessful exploitation allows an attacker to instantiate arbitrary classes present in the application classpath during the initialization of a database connection. This can lead to local code execution or other malicious side effects on the client application depending on the available gadgets within the victim's runtime environment. The impact is significant for applications that accept database configuration from untrusted sources, such as multi-tenant platforms or web applications allowing user-defined database connectivity settings.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 id=\"recommendation\"\u003eRecommendation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePrioritized actions for mitigation and defense:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUpgrade the openGauss-connector-jdbc library to version 7.0.0-LTS or higher to incorporate the asSubclass(Log.class) type validation fix.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAudit all application code paths that allow external inputs to modify JDBC connection parameters, particularly the logger configuration settings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eImplement strict input validation or allowlisting for JDBC connection parameters if upgrading the library is not immediately feasible.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-10-19T04:57:39Z","date_published":"2026-10-19T04:57:39Z","id":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-opengauss-jdbc-vulnerability/","summary":"A vulnerability in the LogFactory component of openGauss-connector-jdbc allows attackers to trigger arbitrary class instantiation via reflection by controlling JDBC logger class parameters.","title":"Arbitrary Class Instantiation in openGauss-connector-jdbc","url":"https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-10-opengauss-jdbc-vulnerability/"}],"language":"en","title":"CraftedSignal Threat Feed - Cpe:2.3:a:opengauss:connector-Jdbc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","version":"https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1"}