<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:webfeeds="http://webfeeds.org/rss/1.0"><channel><title>Cpe:2.3:a:hickory:hickory-Resolver:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* - CraftedSignal Threat Feed</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/cpes/cpe2.3ahickoryhickory-resolver/</link><description>Trending threats, MITRE ATT&amp;CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><managingEditor>hello@craftedsignal.io</managingEditor><webMaster>hello@craftedsignal.io</webMaster><lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 16:08:55 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://feed.craftedsignal.io/cpes/cpe2.3ahickoryhickory-resolver/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><webfeeds:icon>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svg</webfeeds:icon><item><title>DNSSEC Validation Bypass in hickory-resolver</title><link>https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-hickory-resolver-dnssec-bypass/</link><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 16:08:55 +0000</pubDate><author>hello@craftedsignal.io</author><guid isPermaLink="true">https://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-hickory-resolver-dnssec-bypass/</guid><description>A vulnerability in hickory-resolver versions prior to 0.26.2 causes the library to ignore bogus DNSSEC proof states, allowing attackers to inject forged DNS records as validated data.</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The hickory-resolver library (versions prior to 0.26.2) contains a security flaw affecting its DNSSEC validation logic. Specifically, the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs fail to correctly propagate the 'bogus' state of a DNSSEC validation result. When a DNS response fails validation, the library does not communicate this status to the calling application, leading it to treat potentially malicious or forged DNS records as cryptographically verified. This issue is particularly dangerous for applications that rely on hickory-resolver to establish secure connections, such as TLS or SSH, as it allows attackers who can intercept network traffic or control an authoritative DNS zone to redirect users to malicious endpoints without triggering validation errors.</p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Successful exploitation allows for the subversion of DNS integrity, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks where traffic is redirected to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This bypasses the security guarantees provided by DNSSEC, potentially leading to unauthorized data interception, phishing, or malware delivery for any application utilizing the affected library for name resolution in a security-sensitive context.</p>
<h2 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h2>
<p>Prioritize the update of the hickory-resolver library across all development environments and production services.</p>
<ul>
<li>Upgrade any application dependencies utilizing hickory-resolver to version 0.26.2 or later to address CVE-2026-93657.</li>
<li>Audit applications that utilize the Resolver::lookup() or Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs to verify they do not rely solely on implicit validation when hickory-resolver is in use.</li>
<li>Monitor for unusual network traffic patterns originating from internal servers to unexpected IP addresses, as this may indicate DNS redirection following a successful bypass.</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded><category domain="severity">high</category><category domain="type">advisory</category><category>dnssec</category><category>vulnerability</category><category>network-security</category></item></channel></rss>