Because of this logic, subsequent requests containing an empty state parameter are incorrectly validated against the existing empty string value in the session. An attacker can exploit this to bind an already-authenticated victim's session cookie to an attacker-controlled OAuth identity. This leads to account fixation or full account takeover, depending on the application context. The vulnerability affects deployments utilizing Google, GitHub, or Slack integrations.

Impact

The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform account takeover or session fixation against users who have previously performed an OAuth flow within their session. This affects any Hatchet deployment where OAuth integrations are enabled. Successful exploitation requires the victim to have an active session and the attacker to induce the victim to perform an action that triggers the flawed callback logic.

Recommendation

• Upgrade all Hatchet deployments to version 0.91.1 or later to implement proper session state key removal.
• Audit application logs for abnormal OAuth callback patterns, specifically requests where the state parameter is absent or empty in conjunction with successful authentication events.
• Restrict OAuth callback endpoints to trusted domains and ensure that the state parameter is strictly validated for non-empty, cryptographically strong values.