Cpe:2.3:a:go-Chi:chi:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* - CraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/cpes/cpe2.3ago-chichi/Trending threats, MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and detection metadata. Fed continuously.Hugoenhello@craftedsignal.iohello@craftedsignal.ioThu, 10 Sep 2026 02:08:07 +0000https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon-32x32.pngCraftedSignal Threat Feedhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/3232https://feed.craftedsignal.io/favicon.svgIP Spoofing Vulnerability in go-chi/chi middleware.RealIPhttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-chi-middleware-spoofing/Thu, 10 Sep 2026 02:08:07 +0000hello@craftedsignal.iohttps://feed.craftedsignal.io/briefs/2026-09-chi-middleware-spoofing/The go-chi/chi middleware.RealIP component contains a vulnerability (CVE-2026-72815) that allows attackers to bypass IP-based ACLs and rate limits by forging the X-Forwarded-For header.The go-chi/chi Go library, specifically the middleware.RealIP component, is vulnerable to an IP spoofing flaw tracked as CVE-2026-72815. The middleware insecurely parses the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header, trusting the leftmost value provided by the client to populate http.Request.RemoteAddr. Because the X-Forwarded-For header is user-controllable, an attacker can supply a forged header (e.g., X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1) to trick the application into believing the request originates from a trusted source, such as the local loopback or a privileged IP range.

This flaw effectively facilitates the bypass of security controls that rely exclusively on IP-based authentication, authorization, or rate limiting. The issue affects go-chi/chi versions 5.2.1 up to, but not including, 5.3.0. While version 5.3.0 introduces secure alternatives, the vulnerable middleware.RealIP remains for backward compatibility, requiring manual code changes by developers to switch to the new ClientIPFrom* middleware series.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass IP-based ACLs and rate-limiting policies. This can lead to unauthorized access to administrative endpoints or services restricted to specific IP addresses. Given the ubiquity of go-chi in Go-based web applications, the impact on security services relying on source IP identification is significant.

Recommendation

Prioritized actions for development and security engineering teams:

  • Update go-chi/chi to version 5.3.0 or later immediately.
  • Audit existing middleware implementations to replace middleware.RealIP with the appropriate ClientIPFrom* variants (e.g., ClientIPFromXFF) that account for trusted proxy chains.
  • Implement infrastructure-level security to ensure that reverse proxies (e.g., Nginx, Envoy, AWS ALB) correctly strip or overwrite incoming X-Forwarded-For headers from untrusted clients before the request reaches the Go application.
  • De-prioritize IP-based ACLs for critical authentication or authorization flows, favoring robust identity-based authentication mechanisms.
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