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high advisory

tsparticles: Remote Denial of Service via Unbounded HTTP Request Body Buffering

The @tsparticles/mcp-server HTTP handler fails to restrict the size of incoming request bodies, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause OOM-driven process termination via a large POST request.

Triage facts

Revision 1
Applicability
@tsparticles/mcp-server
Evidence
Unknown
Severity
High
Action
Elevated
Sources
1 public source
Freshness
Revision 1Nov 11, 07:31 UTC
Source quality
A5Likely

The HTTP server mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The application's /mcp POST endpoint accumulates all incoming request body chunks into an in-memory Buffer[] array without enforcing size limits or checking the Content-Length header. An attacker can stream an arbitrarily large body, exhausting the Node.js process memory and triggering an OOM-killer termination. The default configuration exposes this endpoint on all network interfaces (0.0.0.0:3000) when deployed via the official Docker image.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to complete service unavailability of the mcp-server instance. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to force an OOM-kill of the containerized process. No credentials are required, and the impact is limited to resource exhaustion rather than direct unauthorized data access or code execution.

Recommendation

  • Update or patch the integrations/mcp-server/src/index.ts file to implement a maximum body size limit during the request stream processing.
  • Implement a check for the Content-Length header before consuming the request body.
  • If immediate patching is not possible, place a reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the service to enforce request body size limits and restrict access to the /mcp endpoint.
  • Monitor container memory usage metrics for abnormal spikes associated with requests to the /mcp endpoint.

Immediate actions

Audit container deployments for the use of the default @tsparticles/mcp-server image.

IT Operations 24h

Threat Hunt

Search for HTTP POST requests to /mcp with unusually high payload sizes or extended duration connections.

T1499 medium medium confidence hunt now

Data: Web server access logs, Application telemetry, Network flow logs

Mitigations

Implement a request body size limit in the application code or a reverse proxy.

immediate IT Operations

Unbounded HTTP Request Body Buffering