Microsoft Teams Meeting Booking Flow Used for Device Code Phishing
Threat actors are using deceptive Microsoft Teams meeting-scheduling pages to trick victims into completing a device code authentication flow, allowing for the theft of session tokens.
Triage facts
Revision 6- Applicability
- AWS, Azure Key Vault +10
- Evidence
- Confirmed activeMedium confidence
- Severity
- High
- Sources
- 14 public sources
- Freshness
- Revision 6Nov 19, 03:46 UTC
- Detection
- 1 rule · 4 IOCs
- Source quality
- B2Likely
Revision history 5 entries · Revision 6
- Revision 6
added detection rule: Detect Excessive M365 Exchange Mailbox Access
Changed: affected_products, iocs, lastmod, priority_signals, references, rules, ttps, updates
Sources: 1
- Revision 5
added coverage for Microsoft 365
Changed: action_plan, iocs, lastmod, references, tags, updates
Sources: 1
- Revision 4
added coverage for Microsoft 365 +1 products
Changed: iocs, lastmod, references, tags, ttps, updates
Sources: 1
- Revision 3
added coverage for Microsoft 365 +5 products
Changed: action_plan, affected_products, iocs, lastmod, priority_signals, references, tags, ttps, updates
Sources: 1
- Revision 2
added coverage for Microsoft 365 +4 products
Changed: action_plan, affected_products, affected_vendors, lastmod, qa_status, references, tags, ttps, updates
Sources: 1
Overview
In mid-October 2026, threat actors targeted a construction sector organization using a spear-phishing email that impersonated a senior executive from a peer company. The email contained a link leading to a typosquatted domain designed to simulate a Microsoft Teams meeting-scheduling interface.
Attack Chain
- The attacker utilized a spear-phishing link embedded in a multi-stage redirect chain.
- The landing page presented a fake 'Microsoft Teams Meeting Scheduler' interface that prompted users to select meeting details.
- Upon user interaction, the backend initiated a Microsoft device code sign-in process. The site copied the resulting user code to the victim's clipboard.
- The site redirected the victim to the legitimate Microsoft device login page to enter the code, which authorized the attacker's session.
Impact
The attack enables the theft of session tokens via the device code authentication flow, potentially granting attackers access to victim accounts.
Recommendation
Defenders should monitor sign-in logs for the 'Cmsi:Cmsi' indicator, which signals device-code authentication. Organizations should investigate authentication attempts originating from unmanaged devices or unexpected infrastructure and consider restricting device code flows where not required through Conditional Access policies.
Immediate actions
Inventory public-facing cloud and CI/CD access keys and credentials for exposure.
Block phishing domains in DNS and Proxy filters.
Block identified malicious domains and URLs in the secure email gateway and proxy.
Threat Hunt
Identify spear-phishing attempts by filtering for email traffic containing multi-stage redirect chains, specifically targeting Microsoft Safe Links (nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com) that point to URL shortening services (e.g., share.google) before resolving to external, non-Microsoft domains.
Data: Email Security/Gateway Logs, Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log
Audit Microsoft 365 sign-in logs for authentication events associated with 'Cmsi:Cmsi' (Device Code Flow) occurring from unrecognized residential proxy IPs or atypical ASN/region combinations. Look for subsequent non-interactive sign-ins utilizing suspicious programmatic User Agents (e.g., python-requests, node) shortly after the device code validation.
Data: Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Sign-in Logs
Investigate highly concurrent, high-volume requests from single IP or user-agent patterns directed at authentication or management endpoints.
Data: Cloud provider login logs, Web server access logs
Search email logs for subject lines starting with 'Outage -' from external senders.
Data: Email gateway logs (subject, sender display name, from address)
Identify users who clicked on tracking links leading to reallifeaccounting.com.
Data: Email click telemetry, Proxy/web logs
Mitigations
Update Safe Links policy and verify email authentication headers.
Credential harvesting phishing campaign
Detection coverage 1
Detect Excessive M365 Exchange Mailbox Access
mediumDetects anomalous mailbox access in M365 by identifying MailItemsAccessed events that are either throttled by Microsoft or exceed an item count threshold of 250.
Detection queries are available on the platform. Get full rules →
Indicators of compromise
4
domain
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| domain | moments-notice.com |
| domain | planetmaison.com |
| domain | newbooker.com |
| domain | reallifeaccounting.com |