Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor Backdoor Analysis
The GraphDoor backdoor, part of Operation ShadowCloud, utilizes the Microsoft Graph API for command-and-control and modular plugin delivery via SharePoint.
Triage facts
Revision 1- Applicability
- Windows
- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- High
- Sources
- 1 public source
- Freshness
- Revision 1Nov 17, 08:59 UTC
- Detection
- 1 rule · 1 IOC
- Source quality
- A
Overview
Operation ShadowCloud involves the use of the GraphDoor backdoor (MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952). The backdoor utilizes the Microsoft Graph API for C2 communication, authenticating a malicious application registration via login.microsoftonline.com to interact with SharePoint document libraries and lists.
Attack Chain
- Persistence and Initialization: GraphDoor creates a named pipe (\.\pipe\p%lu) and a hidden directory at C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log<random-GUID>.
- Authentication: The malware authenticates a malicious application registration against login.microsoftonline.com using embedded OAuth credentials to obtain an access token.
- C2 and Exfiltration: It connects to graph.microsoft.com to store encrypted data in files masquerading as .js.map files within SharePoint.
- Plugin Delivery: It retrieves modular plugins (scr.ts, pr.ts, kl.ts) from SharePoint lists and executes them in memory using a COFF object loader.
Impact
Compromised hosts may be subjected to keylogging, process listing, screen capture, and arbitrary command execution via 'shell' or 'adsmload' commands.
Recommendation
Review and audit OAuth application registrations and service principals that possess Graph API permissions. Monitor egress traffic for connections to login.microsoftonline.com and graph.microsoft.com.
Detection coverage 1
GraphDoor Named Pipe Creation
highDetects the creation of named pipes following the GraphDoor pattern \\.\pipe\p%lu.
Detection queries are available on the platform. Get full rules →
Indicators of compromise
1
hash_md5
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| hash_md5 | 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952 |