Living-off-the-land Binary Execution from Non-System Drives
This detection focuses on the execution of common Windows system binaries (LOLBins) originating from non-standard drive locations, a technique frequently used in ransomware and loader deployments to bypass directory-based execution restrictions.
Triage facts
Revision 1- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- Medium
- Action
- Monitor or close
- Sources
- 1 public source
- Freshness
- Revision 1Nov 10, 03:04 UTC
- Detection
- 1 rule
- Source quality
- A2Roughly even chance
Attackers often leverage mounted ISO files, removable media, or temporary drive mappings to execute malicious code using legitimate system tools. This behavior is documented in multiple incident reports involving malware loaders and ransomware groups that rely on bypassing standard C: drive execution monitoring.
Impact
Execution of signed system binaries from non-standard drives can facilitate lateral movement, payload execution, and persistence while evading traditional path-based allowlists.
Recommendation
- Deploy the provided Sigma rule to monitor for process creation events originating from drives other than C:.
- Baseline common administrative tasks in the environment to reduce false positives on multi-drive servers.
- Review process creation logs for LOLBins (e.g., rundll32, regsvr32, mshta) where the CurrentDirectory field does not begin with 'C:'.
Threat Hunt
Identify processes spawned from non-standard drive letters
Data: CurrentDirectory, Image
Detection coverage 1
Detect LOLBIN Execution From Abnormal Drive
mediumDetects common LOLBins executing from drives other than C:, often indicative of execution from mounted ISOs or removable media
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