Detection of external remote SMB logon activity
Successful remote SMB authentication originating from external, non-private IP addresses can indicate exposed services and potential credential exploitation.
Triage facts
Revision 1- Applicability
- Windows
- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- High
- Action
- Elevated
- Sources
- 1 public source
- Freshness
- Revision 1Nov 6, 22:59 UTC
- Detection
- 1 rule
- Source quality
- B2Likely
This brief addresses the detection of successful remote SMB (Logon Type 3) authentication sessions where the source IP address is classified as a public IP. Such activity suggests that the SMB service is exposed to the internet, creating a significant risk for brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, or unauthorized remote file access.
Recommendation
- Deploy the Sigma rule below to monitor for successful external SMB logons in Windows Security event logs.
- Audit edge firewalls to ensure TCP port 445 is not exposed to the public internet.
- Implement restrictive network ACLs or VPN requirements for any service requiring SMB access.
- Review authentication logs for accounts consistently triggering these alerts to identify potentially compromised credentials.
Immediate actions
Review perimeter firewall configurations to identify exposed SMB (TCP 445) ports.
Threat Hunt
Identify historical 4624 events from non-RFC1918 IPs
Data: Windows Event Log 4624
Mitigations
Block TCP 445 on internet-facing interfaces.
SMB port exposure
Detection coverage 1
Detect Successful External Remote SMB Logon
highDetects successful remote SMB authentication (Logon Type 3) originating from non-RFC1918 (public) IP addresses, indicating potential exposure of the SMB service.
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