VMware ESXi: Unauthorized local account creation detection
This brief details the detection of local account creation on VMware ESXi hosts, a technique frequently used by threat actors to establish persistence on hypervisors.
Triage facts
Revision 1- Applicability
- ESXi
- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- Medium
- Action
- Elevated
- Sources
- 4 public sources
- Freshness
- Revision 1Nov 3, 15:31 UTC
- Source quality
- B2Likely
Local account creation on VMware ESXi hosts serves as a persistence mechanism that survives session termination. Unauthorized accounts, often created via the Host Client or esxcli system commands, are a known precursor to hypervisor-level control, particularly in ransomware campaigns. Organizations should audit account creation events against expected administrative activity.
Impact
Unauthorized local accounts provide persistent access to the ESXi hypervisor, enabling potential lateral movement, data exfiltration, or deployment of ransomware by threat actors who have gained initial management access.
Recommendation
- Deploy log collection for VMware ESXi using the Elastic vSphere integration to ensure visibility into
hostdand shell execution logs. - Establish a baseline of authorized administrative accounts for all ESXi hosts.
- Monitor for the creation of local accounts (
esxcli system account add) or logs indicating an account was created on a host. - Investigate any account creation not tied to documented onboarding or break-glass procedures by identifying the user who performed the action and checking for subsequent assignment of administrative roles.
Threat Hunt
Identify and validate all local account creation events on ESXi hosts
Data: VMware ESXi hostd.log, VMware ESXi shell.log
Mitigations
Remove unauthorized accounts via esxcli system account remove --id <name>
T1136.001