Cobalt Strike: Suspicious DNS beaconing patterns
This detection addresses suspicious DNS query patterns associated with Cobalt Strike beaconing activity as documented by the SigmaHQ project.
Triage facts
Revision 1- Applicability
- Windows
- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- Critical
- Action
- Elevated
- Sources
- 3 public sources
- Freshness
- Revision 1Nov 10, 03:35 UTC
- Detection
- 1 rule
- Source quality
- B2Likely
This brief provides detection logic for identifying specific DNS query structures historically associated with Cobalt Strike beaconing. These query patterns are often observed during command and control (C2) communication when the beacon is configured to use DNS as a transport mechanism.
Recommendation
- Enable the Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client/Operational event log to capture the telemetry required for this rule.
- Deploy the provided Sigma rule to your SIEM to monitor for DNS queries matching known Cobalt Strike patterns.
- Investigate any DNS queries identified by this rule for potential C2 activity, particularly those originating from unauthorized or sensitive internal hosts.
Immediate actions
Enable Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client/Operational logging across the fleet
Deploy Sigma rule for Cobalt Strike DNS detection
Threat Hunt
Search existing DNS logs for historical occurrences of .stage. or post.1 query prefixes
Data: DNS query logs
Detection coverage 1
Detect Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing
criticalDetects DNS queries known to be used by Cobalt Strike beacons based on naming patterns in the query string.
Detection queries are available on the platform. Get full rules →