Sarcoma Ransomware Group Activity
The Sarcoma ransomware-as-a-service group continues to target mid-market organizations globally, recently exfiltrating 1.2 TB of data from a new victim in the United States.
Sarcoma is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group that emerged in October 2024. Since its inception, the group has become highly active, with over 140 documented victims across sectors including manufacturing, professional services, healthcare, and retail. Approximately 50 percent of their targeting is focused on organizations within the United States. The group maintains a consistent operational cadence, with an average delay of over 170 days between initial compromise and the public disclosure of stolen data on their leak site.
Defenders should note that the group relies on a blend of commodity tooling and manual post-exploitation techniques. They frequently target mid-market firms that may lack the resources for robust endpoint monitoring. The group's infrastructure includes a dedicated Tor-based leak site used for the extortion phase of their operations. As of October 2026, the group remains active, and organizations in the identified high-risk sectors should prioritize visibility into credential usage and unusual network discovery activity.
Attack Chain
- Initial Access: The group gains entry by exploiting vulnerabilities in public-facing applications or through spearphishing attachments.
- Discovery: Attackers perform network reconnaissance using tools such as Advanced IP Scanner to map internal assets and identify critical file servers.
- Credential Access: The group executes OS credential dumping techniques to harvest administrative or service account passwords.
- Persistence: Persistence is established through the creation of malicious scheduled tasks or by modifying system registry keys.
- Lateral Movement: Using compromised credentials and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, attackers move laterally across the network to access sensitive systems.
- Collection: Attackers use scripts or manual discovery to identify and archive sensitive data, such as PST files and database dumps.
- Exfiltration: Stolen data is staged and exfiltrated to attacker-controlled storage using web services to bypass typical egress monitoring.
- Impact: Ransomware is deployed to encrypt files and inhibit system recovery, followed by the publication of stolen data on the Sarcoma leak site.
Impact
The Sarcoma group has caused significant operational disruption for at least 142 victims since 2024. Data exfiltration often involves large volumes, with recent incidents involving over 1 TB of sensitive company data. Target organizations face dual-extortion threats, where both system downtime and the public exposure of proprietary or regulated information (such as PST files) pose significant financial and reputational risks.
Recommendation
- Monitor for the execution of network scanning tools, specifically Advanced IP Scanner, on internal servers to identify the discovery phase of an attack.
- Implement strict access controls and monitor for the creation of unauthorized scheduled tasks, which the group uses for persistence.
- Audit and restrict the use of RMM tools to only approved administrative workstations.
- Monitor network egress traffic for large file transfers to unauthorized web services, aligning with the group's exfiltration TTPs.
- Block traffic to the known Sarcoma leak site domain (sarcomawmawlhov7o5mdhz4eszxxlkyaoiyiy2b5iwxnds2dmb4jakad.onion) at the network perimeter if organizationally feasible.
Immediate actions
Deploy hunting queries for unauthorized network scanning activity.
Threat Hunt
Identification of unusual scheduled tasks created on file servers.
Data: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) / Event ID 106 (Scheduled Task)
Indicators of compromise
1
domain
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| domain | sarcomawmawlhov7o5mdhz4eszxxlkyaoiyiy2b5iwxnds2dmb4jakad.onion |