Abuse of Odbcconf.exe via Response Files for Code Execution

The Microsoft Windows utility odbcconf.exe is being utilized by threat actors as a Living off the Land (LotL) binary to facilitate arbitrary code execution and malicious DLL loading. By leveraging the configuration capabilities of the tool, attackers can invoke response files (typically ending in the .rsp extension) through the command-line flags -f or /f. These response files contain specific instructions that Odbcconf interprets, allowing the attacker to trigger unintended actions such as registering DLLs via REGSVR. This technique effectively circumvents traditional execution controls that might otherwise flag the direct execution of malicious binaries, as the underlying process is a trusted, signed Windows component. Defenders should monitor for command-line patterns involving the invocation of Odbcconf with response file parameters to identify potential persistence or execution staging.

Attack Chain

1. Attacker gains initial access or maintains persistence on a target Windows host.
2. Attacker prepares a custom response file (.rsp) containing configuration directives.
3. Attacker stages the response file to a directory accessible by the user account.
4. Attacker executes odbcconf.exe using command-line arguments -f or /f to point to the malicious .rsp file.
5. Odbcconf.exe parses the response file, which includes instructions to execute system functions.
6. The process loads the specified malicious DLL or performs the intended system configuration change.
7. Attacker achieves arbitrary code execution within the context of the Odbcconf process.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this technique allows attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on compromised Windows systems. Because Odbcconf is a signed, legitimate system binary, this technique is frequently used to bypass application whitelisting and other behavior-based security controls, complicating incident response and detection efforts.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule provided below to your SIEM to monitor for suspicious Odbcconf command-line activity.
• Enable process creation logging (Sysmon Event ID 1 or Windows Event ID 4688) with full command-line auditing to capture the necessary arguments.
• Establish a baseline for legitimate Odbcconf usage in your environment to minimize false positives associated with standard administrative maintenance tasks.
• Regularly audit the usage of response files within the environment to identify unauthorized configuration changes.