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UAC-0099 and Sandworm collaboration: MythicRatatoskr backdoor and destructive wiping

UAC-0099 gained initial access to a Ukrainian organization via spearphishing to deploy the MythicRatatoskr backdoor, which uses the Yggdrasil mesh network for C2, before handing off access to Sandworm for destructive data-wiping.

Triage facts

Revision 1
Applicability
Windows
Evidence
Unknown
Severity
Critical
Action
Immediate escalation
Sources
1 public source
Freshness
Revision 1Oct 23, 08:57 UTC
Detection
2 IOCs
Source quality
A1Almost certain

ESET research identified a collaboration between UAC-0099 and Sandworm targeting a Ukrainian grain logistics firm. UAC-0099 provided initial access via spearphishing and the MATCHWOK backdoor, subsequently deploying the novel Go-based 'MythicRatatoskr' backdoor. This backdoor leverages the Yggdrasil decentralized mesh network for C2 communications, providing robust, non-centralized connectivity. After lateral movement and the deployment of proxy tools, Sandworm executed a destructive data-wiping attack using SDelete via Active Directory Group Policy.

Attack Chain

  1. Initial Access: UAC-0099 delivered a malicious attachment via spearphishing email (July 16, 2025).
  2. Execution: A scheduled task 'pdfopentask' executed a PowerShell payload from %temp%.
  3. Downloader: Deployment of the MATCHBOIL downloader to fetch and execute the MATCHWOK backdoor.
  4. Backdoor Deployment: Delivery of the MythicRatatoskr backdoor, which persists as a Windows service.
  5. Lateral Movement: Additional MythicRatatoskr samples deployed to other hosts via OpenSSH SFTP.
  6. Proxy Deployment: Deployment of a SOCKS5 server via MythicRatatoskr to facilitate internal pivoting.
  7. Impact: Sandworm deployed SDelete via Active Directory Group Policy to perform data wiping (September 17, 2025).

Impact

The campaign resulted in the compromise of multiple internal systems and culminated in destructive data-wiping operations against the target organization, leading to significant operational disruption.

Recommendation

  • Deploy detection for atypical Windows services, particularly those running Go-compiled binaries that exhibit Yggdrasil mesh networking characteristics.
  • Monitor for the creation of scheduled tasks named 'pdfopentask' and unauthorized PowerShell execution from temporary directories.
  • Audit Active Directory Group Policy objects for the unauthorized distribution of utility tools such as SDelete.
  • Hunt for outbound traffic over non-standard ports or encrypted overlay networks (specifically Yggdrasil-related IPv6 traffic) originating from internal assets.

Immediate actions

Block the identified MATCHWOK C2 and staging URLs in the perimeter firewall/proxy.

SOC 2h

Threat Hunt

Identify scheduled tasks named pdfopentask and trace the parent process (likely PowerShell).

T1053.005 high high confidence hunt now

Data: Windows Event ID 4698

Search for Yggdrasil-related IPv6 traffic or unexpected mesh networking binaries.

T1071.001 high high confidence hunt now

Data: Netflow, Host network connection logs

Mitigations

Restrict execution of SDelete and similar administrative tools to authorized security/IT accounts only.

immediate IT Operations

Sandworm destructive tactics

Indicators of compromise

2

url

TypeValue
urlhttps://uztickets.com
urlhttps://egyptanimals.com/animals/photoalbum