eMudhra: Eight compromised intermediate CA keys threaten TLS trust
Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were compromised. A researcher found one key had the integer value 4; Mozilla blocked the affected certificates and updated its trust store.
Triage facts
Revision 3- Applicability
- emSign intermediate CA certificates
- Evidence
- Unknown
- Severity
- Critical
- Action
- Immediate escalation
- Sources
- 4 public sources
- Freshness
- Revision 3Oct 21, 08:26 UTC
- Source quality
- A1
Revision history 2 entries · Revision 3
- Revision 3
Redirected the overlapping auto-generated eMudhra brief here.
Changed: aliases
- Revision 2
Named the eight compromised TLS and code-signing intermediate CAs from Mozilla's incident record.
Changed: references, body
Sources: 1
Mozilla received a report on 17 October 2026 that private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates had been compromised. Security researcher Scott Helme independently recovered the weak keys from the public certificates and reported that one private key was the integer 4; others included 56 and 115. This describes a very small key value, not a four-byte certificate. A holder of a compromised CA key could issue fraudulent HTTPS certificates. Intercepting a connection would also require an on-path position. The cited sources do not establish observed malicious use of these keys.
Affected intermediate CAs
Mozilla's incident record identifies six TLS issuers and two code-signing issuers. The names and CCADB identifiers are:
| Purpose | Intermediate CA | CCADB ID |
|---|---|---|
| TLS | EM EV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV) | A012304 |
| TLS | EM OV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV) | A012308 |
| TLS | EM DV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV) | A012302 |
| TLS | EM EV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc) | A012296 |
| TLS | EM OV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc) | A012300 |
| TLS | EM DV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc) | A012294 |
| Code signing | EM OV CS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV) | A012306 |
| Code signing | EM OV CS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc) | A012298 |
Use the SHA-256 certificate fingerprints in Mozilla's incident record when matching a certificate chain; a CA name alone is not a reliable cryptographic identifier.
Mozilla blocked the affected certificates through Firefox OneCRL on 17 October and released Firefox and NSS updates for clients that may not receive that block. The certifi maintainer removed the affected emSign roots from its CA bundle in version 2026.10.18.
Recommendation
- Check which browsers, libraries, containers, and custom trust stores still trust the affected certificate chain.
- Apply current browser and NSS updates; update affected certifi installations to 2026.10.18 or later and rebuild bundled images.
- Investigate any suspicious TLS certificate chains issued through the affected intermediates, while keeping observed exploitation separate from the confirmed key compromise.
Immediate actions
Identify TLS clients and applications that trust the affected eMudhra certificate chain
Mitigations
Apply current browser and trust-store updates, including affected certifi bundles
emSign intermediate CA certificates