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eMudhra: Eight compromised intermediate CA keys threaten TLS trust

Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were compromised. A researcher found one key had the integer value 4; Mozilla blocked the affected certificates and updated its trust store.

Triage facts

Revision 3
Applicability
emSign intermediate CA certificates
Evidence
Unknown
Severity
Critical
Action
Immediate escalation
Sources
4 public sources
Freshness
Revision 3Oct 21, 08:26 UTC
Source quality
A1
Revision history 2 entries · Revision 3
  1. Revision 3

    Redirected the overlapping auto-generated eMudhra brief here.

    Changed: aliases

  2. Revision 2

    Named the eight compromised TLS and code-signing intermediate CAs from Mozilla's incident record.

    Changed: references, body

    Sources: 1

Mozilla received a report on 17 October 2026 that private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates had been compromised. Security researcher Scott Helme independently recovered the weak keys from the public certificates and reported that one private key was the integer 4; others included 56 and 115. This describes a very small key value, not a four-byte certificate. A holder of a compromised CA key could issue fraudulent HTTPS certificates. Intercepting a connection would also require an on-path position. The cited sources do not establish observed malicious use of these keys.

Affected intermediate CAs

Mozilla's incident record identifies six TLS issuers and two code-signing issuers. The names and CCADB identifiers are:

PurposeIntermediate CACCADB ID
TLSEM EV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV)A012304
TLSEM OV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV)A012308
TLSEM DV TLS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV)A012302
TLSEM EV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc)A012296
TLSEM OV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc)A012300
TLSEM DV TLS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc)A012294
Code signingEM OV CS CA - G3B (eMudhra BV)A012306
Code signingEM OV CS CA - G3C (eMudhra Inc)A012298

Use the SHA-256 certificate fingerprints in Mozilla's incident record when matching a certificate chain; a CA name alone is not a reliable cryptographic identifier.

Mozilla blocked the affected certificates through Firefox OneCRL on 17 October and released Firefox and NSS updates for clients that may not receive that block. The certifi maintainer removed the affected emSign roots from its CA bundle in version 2026.10.18.

Recommendation

  • Check which browsers, libraries, containers, and custom trust stores still trust the affected certificate chain.
  • Apply current browser and NSS updates; update affected certifi installations to 2026.10.18 or later and rebuild bundled images.
  • Investigate any suspicious TLS certificate chains issued through the affected intermediates, while keeping observed exploitation separate from the confirmed key compromise.

Immediate actions

Identify TLS clients and applications that trust the affected eMudhra certificate chain

IT Operations 24h

Mitigations

Apply current browser and trust-store updates, including affected certifi bundles

immediate IT Operations

emSign intermediate CA certificates