Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking in Cline Hub Dashboard

The Cline Hub dashboard server ('@cline/cline-hub'), typically initiated via the cline dashboard CLI command, contains a critical security flaw involving Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). In its default configuration, the dashboard binds to 127.0.0.1 without requiring a ROOM_SECRET. Under these conditions, the server's isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() function returns true for all requests and performs no validation of the HTTP Origin header during the WebSocket upgrade process.

This vulnerability allows any malicious website visited by a developer running the Cline dashboard to open a WebSocket connection to ws://127.0.0.1:8787/browser. Once connected, the attacker can interact with the Cline session as if they were a legitimate user. This includes the ability to inject malicious MCP server configurations, modify tool approval policies, and command agent sessions to perform unauthorized actions such as file system manipulation or arbitrary command execution on the host machine. Because dashboard sessions default to auto-approving tools, this process requires no victim interaction beyond simply visiting a compromised page.

Attack Chain

1. The victim starts cline dashboard locally, which defaults to 127.0.0.1:8787 without a ROOM_SECRET.
2. The attacker lures the victim to a malicious website containing a cross-origin WebSocket payload.
3. The victim's browser initiates a WebSocket connection request to ws://127.0.0.1:8787/browser.
4. The Cline Hub dashboard server receives the request, identifies the missing secret, and unconditionally approves the connection, ignoring the Origin header.
5. The attacker's script sends a desktopCommand frame of type upsert_mcp_server over the established WebSocket.
6. The server processes the frame and writes a malicious stdio MCP server entry to $CLINE_DATA_DIR/settings/cline_mcp_settings.json.
7. Upon the next invocation or activation of the MCP server by the Cline agent, the injected command is executed with the privileges of the victim's local user account.

Impact

Successful exploitation allows for full command execution on the developer's local machine, potential exfiltration of sensitive session tokens or API keys, and persistent compromise via the injection of malicious MCP server entries into the developer's configuration files. This impacts any environment where developers use the default dashboard settings, posing a significant risk to individual workstations and the local development ecosystem.

Recommendation

1. Ensure that the ROOM_SECRET environment variable is always explicitly set for any instance of the Cline dashboard to enforce mandatory authentication.
2. Implement local firewall rules or browser security extensions to restrict WebSocket connections to 127.0.0.1 to authorized origins only.
3. Regularly audit $CLINE_DATA_DIR/settings/cline_mcp_settings.json for unexpected entries or suspicious stdio commands.
4. Avoid running the cline dashboard in environments where untrusted browser activity is expected.