PraisonAI `multiedit` Tool Vulnerability Allows Arbitrary File Read/Write and RCE

A severe arbitrary file read and write vulnerability has been discovered in the multiedit tool within the PraisonAI framework, impacting versions prior to 4.6.61. This flaw, tracked as GHSA-29w3-p9w9-wc47, arises from a complete lack of path validation, workspace boundary checks, or protected path guards when the filepath parameter is used with open() for both read and write operations. Threat actors can exploit this by crafting malicious prompts, user inputs in chatbots, or YAML workflow configurations that influence an AI agent's arguments to the multiedit tool. This allows for the exfiltration of sensitive information, such as SSH keys and cloud credentials, and the overwrite of critical system or application files, potentially leading to privilege escalation and remote code execution on affected systems.

Attack Chain

1. Initial Access: A threat actor crafts malicious input (e.g., a specially designed prompt, a user message in a chatbot, or a YAML workflow configuration) to influence the arguments of an AI agent utilizing the PraisonAI framework.
2. Agent Interaction: The AI agent, operating with the vulnerable PraisonAI multiedit tool, receives and processes the attacker-controlled input, which specifies a malicious filepath parameter.
3. Tool Execution: The AI agent invokes the multiedit tool (e.g., via python -c "import praisonai.tools.multiedit; multiedit('/etc/shadow', ...)") with the unvalidated filepath.
4. Arbitrary File Read: The multiedit tool, due to missing path validation, attempts to read content from the attacker-specified sensitive file (e.g., /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) and leaks it via the dry_run output or other return mechanisms.
5. Arbitrary File Write: Simultaneously or subsequently, the attacker can use the multiedit tool to write to or overwrite critical system or user configuration files (e.g., ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, web application source code).
6. Privilege Escalation / Persistence: By writing to files like authorized_keys or shell startup scripts, the attacker establishes persistence, gains elevated privileges, or achieves remote code execution upon the next login or script execution.
7. Impact: The attacker exfiltrates sensitive data (step 4) or executes arbitrary commands (step 6), leading to full system compromise, data destruction, or further network lateral movement.

Impact

This vulnerability poses a critical risk to PraisonAI deployments, particularly where AI agents interact with user-provided input or process untrusted configurations with auto_approve_tools=True. Successful exploitation allows attackers, who can influence the filepath parameter, to read any file accessible by the PraisonAI process user, including highly sensitive data like SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials), /etc/shadow, and .env files. Furthermore, attackers can overwrite arbitrary files, enabling various destructive outcomes such as defacing web applications, injecting malicious scripts into startup files (.bashrc), or gaining persistent access and privilege escalation by writing to authorized_keys. The broad impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability makes this a severe threat for affected organizations.

Recommendation

• Upgrade the praisonai package to version 4.6.61 or later immediately to remediate the GHSA-29w3-p9w9-wc47 vulnerability.
• Deploy the provided Sigma rules to your SIEM for detection of suspicious Python activity targeting sensitive files.
• Ensure Sysmon process-creation and file-event logging is enabled on systems running PraisonAI agents to activate the rules above.
• If possible, configure PraisonAI agents to require explicit approval for tool usage (e.g., using @require_approval(risk_level="high") on sensitive tools) instead of auto_approve_tools=True.