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high advisory

Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity

This brief detects potential remote desktop shadowing activity by identifying modifications to the RDP Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session, which adversaries may abuse to spy on or control other users' RDP sessions.

This detection identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. The rule aims to detect adversaries abusing the RDP Shadowing feature to monitor or control other users’ active RDP sessions. The rule leverages data from various sources including endpoint logs, Windows event logs (Sysmon), Elastic Endgame, Microsoft Defender XDR, and SentinelOne Cloud Funnel. RDP Shadowing can be abused to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or perform malicious actions on behalf of the user.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains initial access to a system via compromised credentials or other means.
  2. The attacker modifies the RDP Shadow registry key to enable shadowing without user consent (e.g., setting the Shadow value to 2 or 4).
  3. The attacker uses mstsc.exe with the /shadow parameter to initiate a shadowing session of a target user’s RDP session. The attacker may also use the /control or /noConsentPrompt to further stealth their activities.
  4. Alternatively, the attacker may execute RdpSaUacHelper.exe or RdpSaProxy.exe processes, typically launched by svchost.exe, on the target system to facilitate the shadowing connection.
  5. The system allows the attacker to view and potentially control the target user’s session.
  6. The attacker monitors user activity, steals credentials, or performs other malicious actions within the compromised session.
  7. The attacker attempts to maintain persistence by ensuring that the modified registry settings remain in place.

Impact

Successful RDP shadowing can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, credential theft, and the ability to perform malicious actions on behalf of the compromised user. This can result in financial loss, data breaches, and reputational damage. The number of victims and sectors targeted depends on the scope of the attacker’s initial access and the value of the targeted user’s session.

Recommendation

  • Monitor registry modifications related to the RDP Shadow key and alert on unexpected changes using the Sigma rule Detect RDPSaUacHelper or RDPSaProxy Execution.
  • Detect the execution of mstsc.exe with the /shadow parameter to identify potential shadowing attempts using the Sigma rule Detect RDP Shadow Registry Modification.
  • Enable Sysmon registry event logging and process creation logging to capture the necessary data for the Sigma rules above.
  • Investigate any alerts related to RDP shadowing promptly to determine if the activity is legitimate or malicious.
  • Review and restrict RDP shadow permissions to limit who can shadow sessions.

Detection coverage 3

Detect RDP Shadow Registry Modification

high

Detects modification of the RDP Shadow registry key to enable shadowing without user consent.

sigma tactics: lateral_movement techniques: T1021.001 sources: registry_set, windows

Detect RDPSaUacHelper or RDPSaProxy Execution

medium

Detects the execution of RdpSaUacHelper.exe or RdpSaProxy.exe, which are indicative of active RDP shadowing sessions.

sigma tactics: lateral_movement techniques: T1021.001 sources: process_creation, windows

Detect MSTSC with Shadow Argument

medium

Detects the execution of mstsc.exe with the /shadow argument, indicating a potential RDP shadowing attempt.

sigma tactics: lateral_movement techniques: T1021.001 sources: process_creation, windows

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