Potential Remote Desktop Shadowing Activity
This brief detects potential remote desktop shadowing activity by identifying modifications to the RDP Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session, which adversaries may abuse to spy on or control other users' RDP sessions.
This detection identifies the modification of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Shadow registry or the execution of processes indicative of an active RDP shadowing session. The rule aims to detect adversaries abusing the RDP Shadowing feature to monitor or control other users’ active RDP sessions. The rule leverages data from various sources including endpoint logs, Windows event logs (Sysmon), Elastic Endgame, Microsoft Defender XDR, and SentinelOne Cloud Funnel. RDP Shadowing can be abused to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or perform malicious actions on behalf of the user.
Attack Chain
- An attacker gains initial access to a system via compromised credentials or other means.
- The attacker modifies the RDP Shadow registry key to enable shadowing without user consent (e.g., setting the
Shadowvalue to2or4). - The attacker uses
mstsc.exewith the/shadowparameter to initiate a shadowing session of a target user’s RDP session. The attacker may also use the/controlor/noConsentPromptto further stealth their activities. - Alternatively, the attacker may execute
RdpSaUacHelper.exeorRdpSaProxy.exeprocesses, typically launched bysvchost.exe, on the target system to facilitate the shadowing connection. - The system allows the attacker to view and potentially control the target user’s session.
- The attacker monitors user activity, steals credentials, or performs other malicious actions within the compromised session.
- The attacker attempts to maintain persistence by ensuring that the modified registry settings remain in place.
Impact
Successful RDP shadowing can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, credential theft, and the ability to perform malicious actions on behalf of the compromised user. This can result in financial loss, data breaches, and reputational damage. The number of victims and sectors targeted depends on the scope of the attacker’s initial access and the value of the targeted user’s session.
Recommendation
- Monitor registry modifications related to the RDP Shadow key and alert on unexpected changes using the Sigma rule
Detect RDPSaUacHelper or RDPSaProxy Execution. - Detect the execution of
mstsc.exewith the/shadowparameter to identify potential shadowing attempts using the Sigma ruleDetect RDP Shadow Registry Modification. - Enable Sysmon registry event logging and process creation logging to capture the necessary data for the Sigma rules above.
- Investigate any alerts related to RDP shadowing promptly to determine if the activity is legitimate or malicious.
- Review and restrict RDP shadow permissions to limit who can shadow sessions.
Detection coverage 3
Detect RDP Shadow Registry Modification
highDetects modification of the RDP Shadow registry key to enable shadowing without user consent.
Detect RDPSaUacHelper or RDPSaProxy Execution
mediumDetects the execution of RdpSaUacHelper.exe or RdpSaProxy.exe, which are indicative of active RDP shadowing sessions.
Detect MSTSC with Shadow Argument
mediumDetects the execution of mstsc.exe with the /shadow argument, indicating a potential RDP shadowing attempt.
Detection queries are available on the platform. Get full rules →