Net::IMAP STARTTLS Stripping Vulnerability
A man-in-the-middle attacker can exploit a vulnerability in Net::IMAP's STARTTLS implementation to bypass TLS encryption, leading to cleartext transmission of sensitive information by injecting a spoofed 'OK' response during the TLS negotiation.
A critical vulnerability exists within the Net::IMAP library, affecting versions 0.6.0 through 0.6.3, 0.5.0 through 0.5.13, 0.4.0 through 0.4.23, and 0 through 0.3.9. This flaw allows a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker to perform a STARTTLS stripping attack. By injecting a specially crafted, tagged “OK” response with a predictable tag before the client completes sending the STARTTLS command, the client prematurely believes TLS negotiation has succeeded. Consequently, the TLS connection is never established, leaving subsequent communication unencrypted. This vulnerability, identified as CVE-2026-42246, enables attackers to intercept and potentially steal sensitive data transmitted in cleartext. Defenders should prioritize patching or implementing mitigations to prevent exploitation.
Attack Chain
- The client initiates a plaintext IMAP connection to the server.
- The client issues a
STARTTLScommand to initiate TLS negotiation. - The MitM attacker intercepts the
STARTTLScommand. - The attacker injects a spoofed
OKresponse with a predictable tag before the IMAP server responds. - The
Net::IMAP#starttlsmethod returns “successfully” due to the prematureOKresponse. - The TLS connection is never established, and the socket remains unencrypted.
- The client continues communication, sending sensitive data (usernames, passwords, emails) in cleartext.
- The attacker intercepts the cleartext data, compromising the client’s account and potentially gaining access to sensitive information.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in a complete bypass of TLS encryption for IMAP communication. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to eavesdrop on sensitive information transmitted between the client and the server, including usernames, passwords, email content, and other confidential data. The vulnerability poses a significant risk to any application using the affected versions of the net-imap gem, potentially impacting a large number of users and organizations.
Recommendation
- Upgrade to a patched version of the
net-imapgem that raises an exception when#starttlsfails to establish TLS, as described in the advisory. - If upgrading is not immediately feasible, explicitly verify
Net::IMAP#tls_verified?returnstrueafter calling#starttlsbefore transmitting any sensitive data. - Consider using implicit TLS connections (connecting directly to a TLS port) instead of relying on
STARTTLS, following the recommendations in RFC 8314.
Detection coverage 2
Detect STARTTLS Command in Network Traffic
infoDetects the STARTTLS command being sent over a network connection, which is the initial step in exploiting CVE-2026-42246.
Detect Cleartext IMAP Login After STARTTLS
highDetects an IMAP LOGIN command sent in cleartext after a STARTTLS command was supposedly negotiated, indicating a potential stripping attack.
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