Komari Agent Abused as SYSTEM-Level Backdoor

Huntress discovered threat actors leveraging the Komari monitoring agent as a SYSTEM-level backdoor within a partner environment. Komari, a Go-based project on GitHub with over 4,000 stars, is designed as a remote-control and monitoring tool. This incident marks a publicly documented case of Komari being abused in a real-world intrusion. The attackers compromised VPN credentials to gain initial access before deploying the Komari agent as a persistent backdoor. Komari inherently functions as a command-and-control (C2) channel, with features enabled by default. The threat actor installed Komari as a Windows service named “Windows Update Service” using NSSM, directly from the official GitHub repository, which avoided the need for attacker-controlled staging infrastructure. The initial discovery occurred on April 16, 2026.

Attack Chain

1. Initial Access: The attacker establishes an SSLVPN session on a FortiGate device from IP address 45.153.34[.]132, authenticating as a legitimate user, [User 1].
2. Internal Reconnaissance: After establishing the VPN connection, the attacker’s workstation, identified as VM8514, begins enumerating the internal network from the tunnel IP 10.212.134[.]200.
3. Lateral Movement: Using Impacket’s smbexec.py, the attacker enables Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on the target workstation, [REDACTED-WRKSTN].
4. RDP Access: The attacker establishes an interactive RDP session to [REDACTED-WRKSTN].
5. Persistence - Service Creation: The attacker uses the Non-Sucking Service Manager (NSSM) to install the Komari agent as a persistent Windows service named “Windows Update Service”.
6. Agent Download: The Komari agent is downloaded from raw.githubusercontent[.]com/komari-monitor/komari-agent using a PowerShell one-liner executed directly on the system.
7. Command and Control: The Komari agent establishes a persistent WebSocket connection to its server, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands (PowerShell/sh) and initiate interactive PTY reverse shell sessions.
8. Maintain Access & Execute: The attacker maintains SYSTEM-level access via the persistent Komari agent, enabling ongoing remote command execution and control over the compromised workstation.

Impact

This attack demonstrates how readily available monitoring tools can be weaponized for malicious purposes. A single compromised account led to the establishment of a SYSTEM-level backdoor on a critical workstation. This could result in data exfiltration, further lateral movement within the network, and potentially ransomware deployment. Microsoft Defender quarantined an earlier registry hive dumping attempt, preventing further data compromise. The number of affected organizations is currently unknown, but any organization using the Komari agent without proper security controls is potentially at risk.

Recommendation

• Monitor FortiGate logs for SSLVPN sessions originating from suspicious IP addresses (45.153.34[.]132) and unusual ASN’s (ASN 51396) to detect potentially compromised credentials.
• Implement the Sigma rule “Detect Komari Agent Installation via PowerShell” to identify installations of the Komari agent.
• Monitor process creation events for the execution of nssm.exe installing a service named “Windows Update Service” to detect suspicious service installations.
• Block the domain raw.githubusercontent[.]com at the DNS resolver or web proxy to prevent the downloading of malicious tools and payloads.