Windows Credential Manager Abuse via VaultCmd

The Windows Credential Manager stores credentials for websites, connected applications, and networks. Attackers may abuse the VaultCmd utility to list or dump these credentials, enabling lateral movement within a network. This involves using VaultCmd with specific arguments, such as /list, to extract sensitive information. Detecting this activity is crucial for identifying unauthorized credential access attempts early in the attack chain. The described technique can be used to further compromise the system or move laterally within the compromised environment.

Attack Chain

1. An attacker gains initial access to a Windows system through various methods, such as exploiting a vulnerability or using stolen credentials.
2. The attacker executes vaultcmd.exe with the /list argument to enumerate the credentials stored in the Windows Credential Manager.
3. The utility retrieves a list of saved credentials, including usernames and passwords, from the credential store.
4. The attacker parses the output of vaultcmd.exe to extract the relevant credential information.
5. The attacker uses the acquired credentials to authenticate to other systems or services within the network.
6. The attacker leverages the newly gained access to move laterally, escalating privileges and accessing sensitive data.
7. The attacker may repeat steps 2-6 on other systems using remote execution, such as PsExec or WMI.
8. The final objective is to exfiltrate sensitive data, deploy ransomware, or maintain long-term access to the network.

Impact

Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, systems, and services. Lateral movement can compromise additional systems, expanding the scope of the attack. Depending on the targeted accounts, this can lead to a full domain compromise. The severity of impact depends on the level of access afforded by the compromised credentials.

Recommendation

• Deploy the Sigma rule Detect VaultCmd Credential Listing to detect the use of VaultCmd with /list* arguments (see "rules" section).
• Enable Sysmon process creation logging to activate the rules above.
• Monitor process execution events for vaultcmd.exe using the /list argument in your SIEM.
• Review endpoint security logs from tools like Microsoft Defender XDR or Crowdstrike for additional context or corroborating evidence of credential access attempts.