Symbolic Link Creation to Shadow Copies for Credential Access
The creation of symbolic links to shadow copies on Windows systems by processes such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe can indicate an attempt to access sensitive files for credential theft.
This activity identifies the creation of symbolic links pointing to shadow copies within a Windows environment. Shadow copies, also known as Volume Shadow Copies, are point-in-time snapshots of volumes that can contain sensitive information, including the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and other critical system files. An attacker can create a symbolic link to these shadow copies, effectively circumventing file system permissions to access these protected files. This technique allows for offline credential dumping and extraction of password hashes. The activity is typically conducted using command-line tools like mklink executed from cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique can be used as part of a broader attack to escalate privileges and move laterally within a network, and matters because it provides a way to steal domain credentials without triggering normal access controls.
Attack Chain
- An attacker gains initial access to a Windows system, possibly through phishing or exploiting a vulnerability.
- The attacker elevates privileges to an administrator level, if necessary, to create shadow copies and symbolic links.
- The attacker uses
vssadmin.exeor similar tools to create a volume shadow copy of the system drive. - The attacker executes
cmd.exeorpowershell.exeto create a symbolic link to a directory within the shadow copy usingmklink. For example,mklink /D C:\shadow_link \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS. - The attacker accesses the linked directory, which contains the shadow copy of the
ntds.ditfile and theSYSTEMregistry hive. - The attacker copies the
ntds.ditfile and theSYSTEMregistry hive to a location accessible for offline credential extraction. - The attacker uses tools like
secretsdump.pyorntdsutil.exeon a separate system to extract password hashes from the copiedntds.ditfile andSYSTEMregistry hive. - The attacker uses the extracted credentials to move laterally within the network or compromise domain accounts.
Impact
Successful exploitation can lead to the compromise of domain credentials, allowing attackers to move laterally within the network, access sensitive data, and potentially disrupt critical services. The impact is particularly severe in Active Directory environments, where stealing the ntds.dit file can compromise the entire domain. The number of potential victims depends on the scope of the attacker's access and the size of the targeted network.
Recommendation
- Enable and monitor Windows Object Access auditing, specifically Event ID 4656 for file system and handle manipulation events, to detect the creation of symbolic links (references the rule setup and description).
- Deploy the Sigma rule "Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created" to your SIEM to detect the execution of
mklinkwith shadow copy paths fromcmd.exeorpowershell.exe(references the provided rule). - Implement restrictions on the use of
mklinkto prevent non-administrative users from creating symbolic links (references the rule remediation steps). - Monitor for the creation of shadow copies using
vssadmin.exeor other volume shadow copy tools, and investigate any unusual activity (references the attack chain). - Investigate any access to
ntds.ditor copies of theSYSTEMregistry hive using the investigation steps from the provided rule.
Detection coverage 2
Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created (Sysmon)
mediumDetects the creation of symbolic links to shadow copy paths using mklink by cmd.exe or powershell.exe via Sysmon event ID 1.
Symbolic Link to Shadow Copy Created (Event ID 4656)
lowDetects the attempt to access a shadow copy via a symbolic link based on event ID 4656.
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