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high advisory

Windows EventLog Autologger Session Disabled via Registry Modification

Adversaries may attempt to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.

Attackers may disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions by modifying specific registry keys, thus evading detection and preventing security monitoring of early boot activities and system events. The AutoLogger event tracing session records events early in the operating system boot process, allowing applications and device drivers to capture traces before user login. Disabling these sessions can blind security monitoring tools, especially those focused on early boot activity, making it harder to detect malicious activity. This technique allows attackers to operate with less scrutiny during critical phases of system startup, potentially enabling persistence or other malicious objectives.

Attack Chain

  1. The attacker gains initial access to the system, possibly through exploitation of a vulnerability or through stolen credentials.
  2. The attacker uses reg.exe or PowerShell to modify the registry.
  3. The attacker targets registry keys under \Control\WMI\Autologger\.
  4. The attacker modifies the Start value to disable specific autologger sessions like EventLog-Application or EventLog-System.
  5. Alternatively, the attacker modifies the Enabled value to disable specific providers of an autologger session.
  6. The attacker executes the command, changing the registry value to disable the targeted autologger session or provider.
  7. The system no longer records events for the disabled autologger session or provider.

Impact

Disabling the Windows EventLog autologger can severely impact an organization’s ability to detect and respond to threats. Security monitoring tools that rely on these logs will be unable to record early boot activities and system events, leading to a gap in visibility. This can allow attackers to establish persistence mechanisms, escalate privileges, or perform other malicious activities without being detected. The impact could range from undetected malware infections to significant data breaches, depending on the attacker’s objectives.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the Sigma rule Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification Via CommandLine to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect this behavior in your environment.
  • Monitor process creation events for reg.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe with command-line arguments that contain \Control\WMI\Autologger\ and either Start or Enabled based on the Sigma rule’s detections.
  • Implement Atomic Red Team simulations to validate detections and train security staff.
  • Investigate any instances of registry modifications related to Autologger sessions to determine if they are legitimate or malicious.

Detection coverage 2

Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification via Reg.exe

high

Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification using reg.exe

sigma tactics: defense-evasion techniques: T1562.002 sources: process_creation, windows

Windows EventLog Autologger Session Registry Modification via PowerShell

high

Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification using PowerShell

sigma tactics: defense-evasion techniques: T1562.002 sources: process_creation, windows

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