Lazarus Group's AppleJeus macOS Backdoor via JMT Trader
The Lazarus APT group is distributing a macOS backdoor named AppleJeus via a fake cryptocurrency trading application called JMT Trader, persisting through a launch daemon and communicating with the C&C server beastgoc.com.
The Lazarus APT group is distributing a new variant of its AppleJeus macOS backdoor through a fake cryptocurrency trading application called “JMT Trader.” The attackers created a fake company and website (jmttrading.org) to distribute the malicious application. The JMTTrader_Mac.dmg disk image contains a package installer (JMTTrader.pkg) that installs the AppleJeus backdoor. The malware utilizes a launch daemon for persistence and communicates with a command-and-control server to receive instructions. This campaign, observed in October 2019, targets macOS users interested in cryptocurrency trading and highlights Lazarus Group’s continued focus on financial gain. The analyzed sample’s SHA1 hash is 74390fba9445188f2489959cb289e73c6fbe58e4.
Attack Chain
- A user is lured to the fake JMT Trading website (jmttrading.org) and downloads the JMTTrader_Mac.dmg disk image.
- The user mounts the disk image, which contains the JMTTrader.pkg installer.
- The user executes the JMTTrader.pkg installer, which prompts for administrative privileges.
- The postinstall script within the package moves
.org.jmttrading.plistto/Library/LaunchDaemons/org.jmttrading.plistand sets permissions. - The script creates the
/Library/JMTTraderdirectory and moves.CrashReporterto/Library/JMTTrader/CrashReporter, setting execute permissions. - The script executes
/Library/JMTTrader/CrashReporterwith theMaintaincommand-line argument for initial connection. - The
CrashReporterbinary connects to the C&C server atbeastgoc.comvia HTTPS POST requests to/grepmonux.php, sending system information (token, version, PID) after XOR “encryption”. - The backdoor awaits commands from the C&C server to perform malicious activities.
Impact
Successful infection allows the Lazarus Group to gain persistent remote access to the compromised macOS system. This can lead to the theft of cryptocurrency, sensitive financial data, or further propagation of malware within the victim’s network. While specific victim counts are unavailable, previous AppleJeus campaigns have targeted cryptocurrency exchanges, potentially resulting in substantial financial losses.
Recommendation
- Monitor process creations for
/Library/JMTTrader/CrashReporterexecuting with theMaintainargument, using the Sigma rule “Detect AppleJeus CrashReporter Execution”. - Monitor network connections to
beastgoc.comon TCP port 443, using the Sigma rule “Detect AppleJeus C2 Communication”. - Block the C&C domain
beastgoc.comat the DNS resolver to prevent initial communication. - Inspect macOS systems for the presence of the launch daemon
/Library/LaunchDaemons/org.jmttrading.plistand theCrashReporterbinary in/Library/JMTTrader/.
Detection coverage 2
Detect AppleJeus CrashReporter Execution
highDetects execution of the AppleJeus CrashReporter binary with the 'Maintain' argument.
Detect AppleJeus C2 Communication
highDetects network connections to the AppleJeus C&C server beastgoc.com.
Detection queries are available on the platform. Get full rules →
Indicators of compromise
1
domain
1
ip
1
url
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| domain | beastgoc.com |
| url | https://beastgoc.com/grepmonux.php |
| ip | 185.228.83.32 |