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medium advisory

Linux Auditd Daemon (Re)Initialization Detection

Detection of Linux audit daemon (auditd) re-initialization events, which can indicate attempts to re-enable audit logging after evasion or restarts with modified rule sets.

This analytic detects the (re)initialization of the Linux audit daemon (auditd) by identifying log entries of type DAEMON_START. This event indicates that the audit subsystem has resumed logging after being stopped or has started during system boot. While DAEMON_START may be expected during reboots or legitimate configuration changes, it can also signal attempts to re-enable audit logging after evasion, or restarts with modified or reduced rule sets. Monitoring this event in correlation with DAEMON_END, DAEMON_ABORT, and auditctl activity provides visibility into the continuity and integrity of audit logs. Frequent or unexplained DAEMON_START events should be investigated, especially if they are not accompanied by valid administrative or system activity. This detection is relevant for environments utilizing auditd for security monitoring and compliance.

Attack Chain

  1. An attacker gains initial access to a Linux system.
  2. The attacker identifies that auditd is enabled and logging events.
  3. The attacker attempts to disable auditd to evade detection, possibly using auditctl -s disable or similar commands.
  4. After performing malicious actions, the attacker may attempt to re-enable auditd, potentially with a modified configuration to avoid logging their activities, triggering a DAEMON_START event.
  5. The attacker modifies the audit rules to exclude specific users, processes, or file paths from being logged.
  6. The attacker restarts the auditd service using systemctl restart auditd or a similar command, generating a DAEMON_START event.
  7. The system resumes logging with the modified audit rules, potentially missing critical security events.

Impact

A successful attack can lead to a compromised Linux host where malicious activities are not properly logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations. Attackers could manipulate audit logs by stopping and restarting the service with altered configurations, reducing the effectiveness of security monitoring. The impact includes a loss of visibility into attacker actions, potentially leading to prolonged compromise and data breaches.

Recommendation

  • Deploy the Sigma rule Linux Auditd Daemon Start to your SIEM and tune for your environment to detect unexpected auditd restarts.
  • Correlate DAEMON_START events with DAEMON_END and DAEMON_ABORT events to identify anomalies in auditd service management.
  • Monitor auditctl activity for unauthorized modifications to audit rules.
  • Investigate frequent or unexplained DAEMON_START events, especially those not accompanied by valid administrative or system activity, as highlighted in the overview.
  • Ensure proper ingestion and normalization of auditd logs using the Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux, as mentioned in the “How to Implement” section.

Detection coverage 3

Linux Auditd Daemon Start

medium

Detects the start of the Linux audit daemon (auditd) by identifying DAEMON_START events.

sigma tactics: defense_evasion techniques: T1562.012 sources: process_creation, linux

Detect Auditd Configuration Changes

medium

Detects changes to the auditd configuration file.

sigma tactics: defense_evasion techniques: T1562.012 sources: file_event, linux

Detect Auditctl Rule Modifications

medium

Detects usage of auditctl to modify audit rules.

sigma tactics: defense_evasion techniques: T1562.012 sources: process_creation, linux

Detection queries are kept inside the platform. Get full rules →